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Abstract—Deep Learning (DL) models have caused a paradigm
shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various impor-
tant fields, ranging from intelligence warfare and healthcare
to autonomous transportation and automated manufacturing.
A practical concern, in the rush to adopt DL models as a
service, is protecting the models against Intellectual Property (IP)
infringement. The DL models are commonly built by allocating
significant computational resources that process vast amounts
of proprietary training data. The resulting models are therefore
considered to be the IP of the model builder and need to be
protected to preserve the owner’s competitive advantage.
This paper proposes DeepSigns, a novel end-to-end IP pro-
tection framework that enables insertion of coherent digital
watermarks in contemporary DL models. DeepSigns, for the
first time, introduces a generic watermarking methodology that
can be used for protecting DL owner’s IP rights in both white-
box and black-box settings, where the adversary may or may
not have the knowledge of the model internals. The suggested
methodology is based on embedding the owner’s signature
(watermark) in the probability density function (pdf) of the
data abstraction obtained in different layers of a DL model.
DeepSigns can demonstrably withstand various removal and
transformation attacks, including model compression, model fine-
tuning, and watermark overwriting. Proof-of-concept evaluations
on MNIST, and CIFAR10 datasets, as well as a wide variety of
neural network architectures including Wide Residual Networks,
Convolution Neural Networks, and Multi-Layer Perceptrons
corroborate DeepSigns’ effectiveness and applicability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth industrial revolution empowered by machine
learning algorithms is underway. The popular class of deep
learning models and other contemporary machine learning
methods are enabling this revolution by providing a significant
leap in accuracy and functionality of the underlying model.
Several applications are already undergoing serious transfor-
mative changes due to the integration of intelligence, including
(but not limited to) social networks, autonomous transporta-
tion, automated manufacturing, natural language processing,
intelligence warfare and smart health [1], [2], [3], [4].
Deep learning is an empirical field in which training a
highly accurate model requires: (i) Having access to a massive
collection of mostly labeled data that furnishes comprehensive
coverage of potential scenarios that might appear in the target
application. (ii) Allocating substantial computing resources to
fine-tune the underlying model topology (i.e., type and number
of hidden layers), hyper-parameters (i.e., learning rate, batch
size, etc.), and DL weights in order to obtain the most accurate
model. Given the costly process of designing and training a
deep neural network, DL models are typically considered to be
the intellectual property of the model builder. Protection of the
models against IP infringement is particularly important for
deep neural networks to preserve the competitive advantage
of the DL model owner and ensure the receipt of continuous
query requests by clients if the model is deployed in the cloud
as a service.
Embedding digital watermarks into deep neural networks is
a key enabler for reliable technology transfer. A digital water-
mark is a type of marker covertly embedded in a signal or IP,
including audio, videos, images, or functional designs. Digital
watermarks are commonly adopted to identify ownership of
the copyright of such a signal or function. Watermarking has
been immensely leveraged over the past decade to protect
the ownership of multimedia and video content, as well as
functional artifacts such as digital integrated circuits [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9]. Extension of watermarking techniques to deep
learning models, however, is still in its infancy.
DL models can be used in either a white-box or a black-box
setting. In a white-box setting, the model parameters are public
and shared with a third-party. Model sharing is a common
approach in the machine learning field (e.g., the Model Zoo
by Caffe Developers, and Alexa Skills by Amazon). Note that
even though models are voluntarily shared with the public, it
is important to protect pertinent IP and preserve the copyright
of the original owner. In the black-box setting, the model
details are not publicly shared and the model is only available
to execute as a remote black-box Application Programming
Interface (API). Most of the DL APIs deployed in cloud
servers fall within the black-box category.
Authors in [10], [11] propose a watermarking approach for
embedding the IP information in the static content of con-
volutional neural networks (i.e., weight matrices). Although
this work provides a significant leap as the first attempt to
watermark neural networks, it poses (at least) three limitations
as we shall discuss in Section VII: (i) It incurs a bounded
watermarking capacity due to the use of static properties
of a model (weights) as opposed to using dynamic content
(activations). Note that the weights of a neural network are
invariable (static) during the execution phase, regardless of
the data passing through the model. The activations, however,
are dynamic and both data- and model-dependent. As such, we
argue that using activations (instead of static weights) provides
more flexibility for watermarking purposes. (ii) It is not robust
against overwriting the original embedded watermark by a
third-party. (iii) It targets white-box settings and is inapplicable
to black-box scenarios.
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TABLE I: Requirements for an effective watermarking of deep neural networks.
Requirements Description
Fidelity The functionality (e.g., accuracy) of the target neural network shall not be degraded as a result of watermark embedding.
Reliability The watermarking methodology shall yield minimal false negatives; the watermarked model shall be effectively detected
using the pertinent keys.
Robustness The watermarking methodology shall be resilient against model modifications such as compression/pruning, fine-tuning,
and/or watermark overwriting.
Integrity The watermarking methodology shall yield minimal false alarms (a.k.a., false positives); the watermarked model should be
uniquely identified using the pertinent keys.
Capacity The watermarking methodology shall be capable of embedding a large amount of information in the target neural network
while satisfying other requirements (e.g., fidelity, reliability, etc.).
Efficiency The communication and computational overhead of watermark embedding and extraction/detection shall be negligible.
Security The watermark shall leave no tangible footprints in the target neural network; thus, an unauthorized individual cannot detect
the presence of a watermark in the model.
Generalizability The watermarking methodology shall be applicable in both white-box and black-box settings.
More recent studies in [12], [13] propose 1-bit watermarking
methodologies that are applicable to black-box models.1 These
approaches are built upon model boundary modification and
the use of random adversarial samples that lie near decision
boundaries. Adversarial samples are known to be statisti-
cally unstable, meaning that the adversarial samples crafted
for a model are not necessarily mis-classified by another
network [14], [15]. Therefore, even though the proposed
approaches in [12], [13] yield a high watermark detection
rate (a.k.a. true positive rate), they are also too sensitive to
hyper-parameter tuning and usually lead to a high false alarm
rate. Note that false ownership proofs based upon watermark
extraction, in turn, jeopardize the integrity of the proposed
watermarking methodology and render the use of watermarks
for IP protection ineffective.
This paper proposes DeepSigns, a novel end-to-end frame-
work that empowers coherent integration of robust digital
watermarks in contemporary deep learning models with no
drop in overall prediction accuracy. The embedded watermarks
can be triggered by a set of corresponding input keys to
remotely detect the existence of the pertinent neural network
in a third-party DL service. DeepSigns, for the first time,
introduces a generic functional watermarking methodology
that is applicable to both white-box and black-box settings.
Unlike prior works that directly embed the watermark infor-
mation in the static content (weights) of the pertinent model,
DeepSigns works by embedding an arbitrary N-bit string into
the probability density function (pdf) of the activation sets
in various layers of a deep neural network. The proposed
methodology is simultaneously data- and model-dependent,
meaning that the watermark information is embedded in the
dynamic content of the DL network and can only be triggered
by passing specific input data to the model. Our suggested
method leaves no visible impacts on the static properties of
the DL model, such as the histogram of the weight matrices.
We provide a comprehensive set of quantitative and qualita-
tive metrics that shall be evaluated to corroborate the effective-
ness of current and pending watermarking methodologies for
deep neural networks (Section II). We demonstrate the robust-
ness of our proposed framework with respect to state-of-the-art
removal and transformative attacks, including model compres-
11-bit and 0-bit watermarking are used interchangeably in the literature.
sion/pruning, model fine-tuning, and watermark overwriting.
Extensive evaluation across various DL model topologies -
including residual networks, convolutional neural networks,
and multi-layer perceptrons - confirms the applicability of
the proposed watermarking framework in different settings
without requiring excessive hyper-parameter tuning to avoid
false alarms and/or accuracy drop. The explicit contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• Proposing DeepSigns, the first end-to-end framework for
systematic deep learning IP protection that works in both
white-box and black-box settings. A novel watermarking
methodology is introduced to encode the pdf of the DL
model and effectively trace the IP ownership. DeepSigns
is significantly more robust against removal and transfor-
mation attacks compared to prior works.
• Providing a comprehensive set of metrics to assess the
performance of watermark embedding methods for DL
models. These metrics enable effective quantitative and
qualitative comparison of current and pending DL model
protection methods that might be proposed in the future.
• Devising an application programming interface to facili-
tate the adoption of DeepSigns watermarking methodol-
ogy for training various DL models, including convolu-
tional, residual, and fully-connected networks.
• Performing extensive proof-of-concept evaluations on
various benchmarks. Our evaluations demonstrate Deep-
Signs’ effectiveness to protect the IP of an arbitrary DL
model and establish the ownership of the model builder.
II. WATERMARKING REQUIREMENTS
There are a set of minimal requirements that should be ad-
dressed to design a robust digital watermark. Table I details the
requirements for an effective watermarking methodology for
DL models. In addition to previously suggested requirements
in [10], [12], we believe reliability, integrity, and generaliz-
ability are three other major factors that need to be considered
when designing a practical DL watermarking methodology.
Reliability is important because the embedded watermark
should be accurately extracted using the pertinent keys; the
model owner is thereby able to detect any misuse of her
model with a high probability. Integrity ensures that the IP
infringement detection policy yields a minimal number of
false alarms, meaning that there is a very low chance of
Fig. 1: DeepSigns Global Flow: DeepSigns performs functional watermarking on DL models by simultaneously embedding a
set of binary WM information in the pdf of the activation set acquired at each intermediate layer and the output layer. Typically,
a specific set of inputs (keys) is used for extracting the embedded watermark. In our case, the inputs triggering the ingrained
binary random strings are used as the key for the detection of IP infringement in both white-box and black-box settings.
falsely proving the ownership of the model used by a third-
party. Generalizability is another main factor in developing
an effective watermarking methodology. Generalizability is
particularly important since the model owner does not know
beforehand whether her model will be misused in a black-box
or white-box setting by a third-party. Nevertheless, the model
owner should be able to detect IP infringement in both settings.
DeepSigns satisfies all the requirements listed in Table I as
shown by our experiments in Section VI.
Potential Attack Scenarios. To validate the robustness of a
potential DL watermarking approach, one should evaluate the
performance of the proposed methodology against (at least)
three types of contemporary attacks: (i) Model fine-tuning.
This type of attack involves re-training of the original model
to alter the model parameters and find a new local minimum
while preserving the accuracy. (ii) Model pruning. Model
pruning is a commonly used approach for efficient execution
of neural networks, particularly on embedded devices. We
consider model pruning as another attack approach that might
affect the watermark extraction/detection. (iii) Watermark
overwriting. A third-party user who is aware of the method-
ology used to embed the watermark in the model (but not the
owner’s private watermark information) may try to embed a
new watermark in the DL network and overwrite the original
one. The objective of an overwriting attack is to insert an
additional watermark in the model and render the original
watermark unreadable. A watermarking methodology should
be robust against fine-tuning, pruning, and overwriting for
effective IP protection.
III. GLOBAL FLOW
Figure 1 demonstrates the high-level block diagram of
the DeepSigns framework. To protect the IP of a particular
neural network, the model owner (a.k.a. Alice) first must
locally embed the watermark (WM) information into her
neural network. Embedding the watermark involves three main
steps: (i) Generating a set of N-bit binary random strings
to be embedded in the pdf distribution of different layers in
the target neural network. (ii) Creating specific input keys to
later trigger the corresponding WM strings after watermark
embedding. (iii) Training (fine-tuning) the neural network with
particular constraints enforced by the WM information within
intermediate activation maps of the target DL model. Details
of each step are discussed in Section IV. Note that local model
watermarking is a one-time task only performed by the owner
before model distribution.
Once the neural network is locally trained by Alice to
include the pertinent watermark information, the model is
ready to be deployed by a third-party DL service provider
(a.k.a. Bob). Bob can either leverage Alice’s model as a black-
box API or a white-box model. To prove the ownership of the
model, Alice queries the remote service provider using her
specific input keys that she has initially selected to trigger
the WM information. She then obtains the corresponding
intermediate activations (in the white-box setting) or the final
model prediction (in the black-box setting). The acquired
activations/predictions are then used to extract the embedded
watermarks and detect whether Alice’s model is used by
Bob within the underlying DL service or not. The details of
watermark extraction are outlined in Section V.
IV. FUNCTIONAL WATERMARKING
Deep learning models possess non-convex loss surfaces with
many local minima that are likely to yield an accuracy (on test
data) very close to another approximate model [16], [17]. The
DeepSigns framework is built upon the fact that there is not a
unique solution for modern non-convex optimization problems
used in deep neural networks. DeepSigns works by iteratively
massaging the corresponding pdf of data abstractions to in-
corporate the desired watermarking information within each
layer of the neural network. This watermarking information
can later be used to claim ownership of the neural network or
detect IP infringement.
In many real-world DL applications, the activation maps
obtained in the intermediate (a.k.a. hidden) layers roughly
follow a Gaussian distribution [18], [19], [20]. In this paper,
we consider a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as the prior
probability to characterize the data distribution at each hidden
layer.2 The last layer (a.k.a. output layer) is an exception since
the output can be a discrete variable (e.g., class label) in a
large category of DL applications. As such, DeepSigns governs
the hidden (Section IV-A) and output (Section IV-B) layers
differently.
A. Watermarking Intermediate Layers
To accommodate for our GMM prior distribution
assumption, we suggest adding the following term to
the conventional cross-entropy loss function (loss0) used for
training deep neural networks:
λ1 ( ‖µly∗ − f l(x, θ)‖22 − Σi 6=y∗‖µli − f l(x, θ)‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss1
). (1)
Here, λ1 is a trade-off hyper-parameter that specifies the
contribution of the additive loss term. The additive loss
function (loss1) aims to minimize the entanglement between
data features (activations) belonging to different classes while
decreasing the inner-class diversity. This loss function, in turn,
helps to augment data features so that they approximately fit a
GMM distribution. On one hand, a large value of λ1 makes the
data activations follow a strict GMM distribution, but large λ1
values might also impact the final accuracy of the model due
to limited contribution of the accuracy-specific cross-entropy
loss function (loss0). On the other hand, a very small value of
λ1 is not adequate to make the activations adhere to a GMM
distribution. Note that the default distribution of activations
may not strictly follow a GMM. We set the value λ1 to 0.01
in all our experiments.
In Equation (1), θ is the set of model parameters (i.e.,
weights and biases), f l(x, θ) is the activation map correspond-
ing to input sample x at the lth layer, y∗ is the ground-truth
label, and µli denotes the mean value of the Gaussian distribu-
tion at layer l that best fits the data abstractions belonging to
class i. In DeepSigns framework, the watermark information
is embedded in the mean value of the pertinent Gaussian
mixture distribution. The mean values µli and intermediate
feature vectors f l(x, θ) in Equation 1 are trainable variables
that are iteratively learned and fine-tuned during the training
process of the target deep neural network.
2We emphasize that our proposed approach is rather generic and is not
restricted to the GMM distribution; the GMM distribution can be replaced
with any other prior distribution depending on the application.
Watermark embedding. To watermark the target neural net-
work, the model owner (Alice) first needs to generate the
designated WM information for each intermediate layer of
her model. Algorithm 1 summarizes the process of watermark
embedding for intermediate layers. In the following passages,
we explicitly discuss each of the steps outlined in Algorithm
1. The model owner shall repeat Steps 1 through 3 for each
layer that she wants to eventually watermark and sum up the
corresponding loss functions for each layer in Step 4 to train
the pertinent DL model.
1 Choosing one (or more) random indices between 1 and
S with no replacement: Each index corresponds to one of the
Gaussian distributions in the target mixture model that contains
a total of S Gaussians. For classification tasks, we set the value
S equal to the number of classes in the target application. The
mean values of the selected distributions µli are then used to
carry the watermark information generated in Steps 2 and 3
as discussed below.
2 Designating an arbitrary binary string to be embedded in
the target model: The elements (a.k.a., bits) of the binary
string are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d).
Henceforth, we refer to this binary string as the vector
b ∈ {0, 1}s×N where s is the number of selected distributions
(Step 1) to carry the watermarking information, and N is a
owner-defined parameter indicating the desired length of the
digital watermark embedded at the mean value of each selected
Gaussian distribution.
3 Specifying a random projection matrix (A): The projection
matrix is used to map the selected centers in Step 1 into the
binary vector chosen in Step 2. The transformation is denoted
as the following:
Gs×Nσ = Sigmoid (µ
s×M . AM×N ),
bs×N = Hard Thresholding (Gs×Nσ , 0.5).
(2)
Here, M is the size of the feature space in the pertinent
layer, and µs×M denotes the concatenated mean values of the
selected distributions. In our experiments, we use a standard
normal distribution N (0, 1) to generate the WM projection
matrix (A). Using i.i.d. samples drawn from a normal distri-
bution ensures that each bit of the binary string is embedded
into all the features associated with the selected centers (mean
values). The σ notation in Equation 2 is used as a subscript to
indicate the deployment of the Sigmoid function. The output
of Sigmoid has a value between 0 and 1. Given the random
nature of the binary string, we decide to set the threshold in
Equation 2 to 0.5, which is the expected value of Sigmoid.
The Hard Thresholding function denoted in Equation 2 maps
the values in Gσ that are greater than 0.5 to ones and the
values less than 0.5 to zeros. This threshold value can be
easily changed in our API if the user decides to change it
for their application. A value greater the 0.5 means that the
binary string has a higher probability to include more zeros
than ones. This setting, in turn, is useful for users who use
biased random number generators.
4 Training the DL model to embed the pertinent watermark
information: The process of computing the vector Gσ is
differentiable. Thereby, for a selected set of projection matrice
(A) and binary strings (b), the selected centers (Gaussian
mean values) can be adjusted/trained via back-propagation
such that the Hamming distance between the binarized
projected centers and the actual WM vectors b is minimized
(ideally zero). To do so, one needs to add the following term
to the overall loss function for each specific layer of the
underlying deep neural network:
−λ2
N∑
j=1
s∑
k=1
(bkj ln(Gkjσ ) + (1− bkj) ln(1−Gkjσ ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss2
. (3)
Here, the variable λ2 is a hyper-parameter that determines
the contribution of loss2 in the process of training the neural
network. All three loss functions (loss0, loss1, and loss2) are
simultaneously used to train/fine-tuned the underlying neural
network. We used Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) in all
our experiments to optimize the DL model parameters with
the explicit constraints outlined in Equations 1 and 3. This
optimization aims to find the best distribution of the activation
sets by iterative data subspace alignment in order to obtain the
highest accuracy while embedding the WM vectors. We set the
λ2 variable to 0.01 in all our experiments, unless mentioned
otherwise. As shown in Section VI, our method is robust on
various benchmarks even though the hyper-parameters are not
explicitly tuned for each application.
B. Watermarking The Output Layer
Neural network prediction in the very last layer of a DL
model needs to closely match the ground-truth data (e.g.,
training labels in a classification task) in order to have the
maximum possible accuracy. As such, instead of directly
regularizing the activation set of the output layer, we choose
to adjust the tails of the decision boundaries to incorporate a
desired statistical bias in the network as a 1-bit watermark.
We focus, in particular, on classification tasks using deep
neural networks. Watermarking the output layer is a post-
processing step that shall be performed after training the model
as discussed in Section IV-A. Figure 2 illustrates the high-
level block-diagram of the DeepSigns framework used for
watermarking the output layer of the underlying DL model.
Learning the PDF distribution of          
model activations  
Generating output WM
Fine-tuning 
the neural 
network
WM WM WM
WM WM WM WM
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Fig. 2: High-level overview of watermarking the output layer
in a neural network. Output watermarking is a post-processing
step performed after embedding the selected binary WMs in
the intermediate (hidden) layers.
The workflow of embedding watermark in the output layer is
summarized in Algorithm 2. In the following, we explicitly
discuss each of the steps outlined in Algorithm 2.
1 Learning the pdf distribution of the activations in each
intermediate layer as discussed in Section IV-A: The acquired
probability density function, in turn, gives us an insight into
both the regions of latent space that are thoroughly occupied
by the training data and the regions that are only covered by
the tail of the GMM distribution, which we refer to as rarely
explored regions. Figure 3 illustrates a simple example of two
clustered Gaussian distribution spreading in a two-dimensional
subspace.
2 Generating a set of K unique random input samples to
be used as the watermarking keys in step 3: Each selected
random sample should be passed through the pre-trained
neural network in order to make sure its latent features lie
within the unused regions (Step 1). If the number of training
data within a -ball of the random sample is fewer than a
threshold, we accept that sample as one of the watermark keys.
Otherwise, a new random sample is generated to replace the
previous sample. A corresponding random ground-truth vector
is generated and assigned to each selected input key sample.
For instance, in a classification application, each random input
is associated with a randomly selected class.
Fig. 3: Due to the high dimensionality of deep learning models
and limited access to labeled training data (the blue and green
dots in the figure), there are sub-spaces within the DL model
that are rarely explored. DeepSigns exploits this mainly unused
capacity to embed the watermark information while minimally
affecting ultimate accuracy.
On one hand, it is desirable to have a high watermark
detection rate after WM embedding. On the other hand, one
needs to ensure a low false positive rate to address the integrity
requirement. As such, we start off by setting the initial key
size to be larger than the owner’s desired value K
′
> K
and generate
{
Xkey
′
, Y key
′
}
accordingly. The target model is
then fine-tuned (Step 3) using a mixture of the generated keys
and a subset of original training data. After fine-tuning, only
keys that are simultaneously correctly classified by the marked
model and incorrectly predicted by the unmarked model are
appropriate candidates that satisfy both a high detection rate
and a low false positive (Step 4). In our experiments, we set
K
′
= 20×K where K is the desired key length selected by
the model owner (Alice).
3 Fine-tuning the pre-trained neural network with the se-
lected random watermarks in Step 2: The model shall be re-
trained such that the neural network has exact predictions (e.g.,
an accuracy greater than 99%) for selected key samples. In our
experiments, we use the same optimizer setting originally used
for training the neural network, except that the learning rate
is reduced by a factor of 10 to prevent accuracy drop in the
prediction of legitimate input data.
4 Selecting the final input key set to trigger the embedded
watermark in the output layer: To do so, we first find out
the indices of initial input keys that are correctly classified
by the marked model. Next, we identify the indices of input
key samples that are not classified correctly by the original
DL model before fine-tuning in Step 3. The common indices
between these two sets are proper candidates to be considered
as the final key. A random subset of applicable input key
samples is then selected based on the required key size (K)
that is defined by the model owner.
It is worth noting that the watermark information embedded
in the output layer can be extracted even in settings where
the DL model is used as a black-box API by a third-party
(Bob). Recently a method called frontier stitching is proposed
to perform 1-bit watermarking in black-box settings [12].
Our proposed approach is different in the sense that we
use random samples that lie within the tail regions of the
probability density function spanned by the model, as opposed
to relying on adversarial samples that lie close to the bound-
aries [21], [22], [14], [15]. Adversarial samples are known to
be statistically unstable, meaning that the adversarial samples
carefully crafted for a model are not necessarily mis-classified
by another network. As shown previously in [12], frontier
stitching is highly vulnerable to the hyper-parameter selection
of the watermarking detection policy and may lead to a high
false positive if it is not precisely tuned; thus jeopardizing the
integrity requirement. As we empirically verify in Section VI,
DeepSigns overcomes this integrity concern by selecting ran-
dom samples within the unused space of the model. This is
due to the fact that the unused regions in the space spanned
by a model are specific to that model, whereas the decision
boundaries for a given task are often highly correlated among
various models.
V. WATERMARKING EXTRACTION
For watermark extraction, the model owner (Alice) needs
to send a set of queries to the DL service provider (Bob). The
queries include the input keys discussed in Sections IV-A and
IV-B. In the case of black-box usage of a neural network,
Alice can only retrieve model predictions for the queried
samples, whereas in the white-box setting, the intermediate
activations can also be recovered. In the rest of this section,
we explicitly discuss the decision policy for IP infringement
detection in both white-box and black-box scenarios. Given
the high dimensionality of neural networks, the probability of
collision for two honest model owners is very unlikely. Two
honest owners should have the exact same weight initializa-
tion, projection matrix, binary string, and input keys to end
up with the same watermark. In case of a malicious user, the
misdetection probability is evaluated for the various attacks
discussed in Section VI.
A. Decision Policy: White-box Setting
To extract watermark information from intermediate (hid-
den) layers, Alice must follow five main steps. Algorithm 3
outlines the decision policy for the white-box scenarios.
(I) Submitting queries to the remote DL service provider using
the selected input keys. To do so, Alice first collects a subset of
the input training data belonging to the selected watermarked
classes (y∗ in Algorithm 1). In our experiments, we use a
subset of 1% of training data as the input key. (II) Acquiring
the activation features corresponding to the input keys. (III)
Computing statistical mean value of the activation features
obtained by passing the selected input keys in Step I. The
acquired mean values are used as an approximation of the
Gaussian centers that are supposed to carry the watermark
information. (IV) Using the mean values obtained in Step III
and her private projection matrix A to extract the pertinent
binary string following the protocol outlined in Equation 2.
(V) Measuring the Bit Error Rate (BER) between the original
watermark string and the extracted string from Step IV. Note
that in case of a mismatch between Alice and Bob models, a
random watermark will be extracted which, in turn, yields a
very high BER.
Algorithm 3 Watermark extraction in white-box setting.
INPUT: Remote DL model T ′; Target Gaussian class y∗
that carries the WM information; Location of the
embedded layer l; Training data
{
Xtrain, Y train
}
;
Owner’s WM information b.
OUTPUT: Extracted watermark b
′
and BER.
1: Key set generation:{
Xkey, Y key
} ←
Select Pairs(
{
Xtrain, Y train
}
, y∗)
2: Acquire activation features:
f l(x, θ)← Forward Pass (T ′ , Xkey, l)
3: Compute mean of activation:
µs×M ← Compute Mean (f l(x, θ))
4: Extract WM:
Gs×Nσ ← Sigmoid (µs×M . AM×N )
b
′ ← Hard Thresholding(Gs×Nσ , 0.5)
5: Evaluate BER:
BER← Number of Bit Mismatches (b, b′)
Return: BER of the queried DL model.
Computation and communication overheads. From Bob’s
point of view, the computation cost is equivalent to the cost
of one forward pass in the pertinent DL model for each query
from Alice. From Alice’s point of view, the computation cost
is divided into two terms. The first term is proportional to
O(M) to compute the statistical mean in Step 3 outlined in
the Algorithm 3. Here, M denotes the feature space size in
the target hidden layer. The second term corresponds to the
computation of matrix multiplication in Step 4 of Algorithm
3, which incurs a cost of O(MN). The communication cost
for Bob is equivalent to the input key length multiplied by
the feature size of intermediate activations (M ), and the
communication cost for Alice is the input key size multiplied
by the input feature size for each sample.
B. Decision Policy: Black-box Setting
To verify the presence of the watermark in the output layer,
Alice needs to statistically analyze Bob’s responses to a set
of input keys. To do so, she must follow four main steps:
(I) Submitting queries to the remote DL service provider
using the randomly selected input keys (Xkey) as discussed in
Section IV-B. (II) Acquiring the output labels corresponding
to the input keys. (III) Computing the number of mismatches
between the model predictions and Alice’s ground-truth labels.
(IV) Thresholding the number of mismatches to derive the
final decision. If the number of mismatches is less than a
threshold, it means that the model used by Bob possesses a
high similarity to the network owned by Alice. Otherwise,
the two models are not replicas. When the two models are
the exact duplicate of one another, the number of mismatches
will be zero and Alice can safely claim the ownership of the
neural network used by the third-party.
Algorithm 4 Watermark detection in the black-box setting.
INPUT: Remote DL model T ′ ; Owner’s input key set{
Xkey, Y key
}
; Maximum tolerated number of mis-
matches NK
OUTPUT: One bit indicating the presence of the owner’s
WM in the remote DL model.
1: Alice sends her input keys Xkey to Bob T .
2: Inference by the remote model:
Y pred ← Predict (T ′ , Xkey)
3: Response comparison:
nk ← Count Mismatch (Y pred, Y key)
4: Decision making:
Presence = 1 if nk < Nk else 0
Return: WM presence indicator (Presence)
In real-world settings, the target DL model might be slightly
modified by Bob in both malicious or non-malicious ways.
Examples of such modifications are model fine-tuning, model
pruning, or WM overwriting. As such, the threshold used for
WM detection should be greater than zero to withstand DL
model modifications. The probability of a network (not owned
TABLE II: Benchmark neural network architectures. Here, 64C3(1) indicates a convolutional layer with 64 output channels
and 3× 3 filters applied with a stride of 2, MP2(1) denotes a max-pooling layer over regions of size 2× 2 and stride of 1,
and 512FC is a fully-connected layer with 512 output neurons. ReLU is used as the activation function in all benchmarks.
Dataset Baseline Accuracy Accuracy of Marked Model DL Model Type DL Model Architecture
MNIST 98.54% K = 20 N = 4 MLP 784-512FC-512FC-10FC98.59% 98.13%
CIFAR10 78.47% K = 20 N = 4 CNN 3*32*32-32C3(1)-32C3(1)-MP2(1)81.46% 80.7% -64C3(1)-64C3(1)-MP2(1)-512FC-10FC
CIFAR10 91.42% K = 20 N = 128 WideResNet Please refer to [23].91.48% 92.02%
by Alice) to make at least nk correct decision according to the
Alice private keys is as follows:
P (Nk > nk|O) = 1−
nk∑
k=0
(
K
k
)
( 1C )
K−k(1− 1C )k, (4)
where O is the oracle DL model used by Bob, Nk is a random
variable indicating the number of matched predictions of the
two models compared against one another, K is the input key
length according to Section IV-B, and C is the number of
classes in the pertinent deep learning application.
Algorithm 4 summarizes the decision policy for the black-
box scenarios. Throughout our experiments, we use the de-
cision policy P (Nk > nk|O) > (1 − 1e−3) for watermark
detection, where P (Nk > nk|O) is defined in Equation 4. The
threshold value used in Step 5 of Algorithm 4 determines the
trade-off between a low false positive rate and a high detection
rate. As we empirically corroborate in Section VI, DeepSigns
satisfies the reliability, integrity, and robustness requirements
in various benchmarks and attack scenarios without demanding
that the model owner explicitly fine-tune her decision policy
hyper-parameters (e.g., the threshold in Equation 4).
Computation and communication overheads. For Bob, the
computation cost is equivalent to the cost of one forward pass
through the underlying neural network per queried input key.
For Alice, the computation cost is the cost of performing
a simple counting to measure the number of mismatches
between the output labels by Bob and the actual labels owned
by Alice. The communication cost for Alice is equivalent
to the key length multiplied by the size of the input layer
in the target neural network. From Bob’s point of view, the
communication cost to send back the corresponding predicted
output is the key length multiplied by the output layer size.
VI. EVALUATIONS
We evaluate the performance of the DeepSigns frame-
work on various datasets including MNIST [24] and CI-
FAR10 [25] with three different neural network architectures.
Table II summarizes the neural network topologies used in
each benchmark. In Table II, K denotes the key size for
watermarking the output layer and N is the length of the
WM used for watermarking the hidden layers. In all white-
box related experiments, we use the second-to-last layer for
watermarking. However, DeepSigns is generic and the exten-
sion of watermarking multiple layers is also supported by
our framework. In the block-box scenario, we use the very
last layer for watermark embedding/detection. To facilitate
watermark embedding and extraction in various DL models,
we provide an accompanying TensorFlow-based [26] API in
which model owners can easily define their specific model
topology, watermark information, training data, and pertinent
hyper-parameters including decision policies’ thresholds, WM
embedding strength (λ1, λ2), and selected layers to carry the
WM information.
DeepSigns satisfies all the requirements listed in Table I. In
the rest of this section, we explicitly evaluate DeepSigns’ per-
formance with respect to each requirement on three common
DL benchmarks.
A. Fidelity
The accuracy of the target neural network shall not be
degraded after embedding the watermark information. Match-
ing the accuracy of the unmarked model is referred to as
fidelity. Table II summarizes the baseline DL model accuracy
(Column 2) and the accuracy of marked models (Column
3) after embedding the WM information. As demonstrated,
DeepSigns respects the fidelity requirement by simultaneously
optimizing for the accuracy of the underlying model (e.g.,
cross-entropy loss function), as well as the additive WM-
specific loss functions (loss1 and loss2) as discussed in
Section IV. In some cases (e.g. wide-ResNet benchmark), we
even observe a slight accuracy improvement compared to the
baseline. This improvement is mainly due to the fact that the
additive loss functions (Equations 1 and 3) and/or exploiting
rarely observed regions act as a form of a regularizer during
the training phase of the target DL model. Regularization, in
turn, helps the model to avoid over-fitting by inducing a small
amount of noise to the DL model [3].
B. Reliability and Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of the DeepSigns framework
against three contemporary removal attacks as discussed in
Section III. The potential attacks include parameter prun-
ing [27], [28], [29], model fine-tuning [30], [31], and water-
mark overwriting [10], [32].
Parameter pruning. We use the pruning approach proposed
in [27] to compress the neural network. For pruning each layer
of a neural network, we first set α% of the parameters that pos-
sess the smallest weight values to zero. The obtained mask is
then used to sparsely fine-tune the model to compensate for the
accuracy drop induced by pruning using conventional cross-
entropy loss function (loss0). Figure 4 illustrates the impact
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 4: Evaluation of the watermark’s robustness against parameter pruning. Figures (a) through (c) (first row) illustrate for
each of the benchmarks listed in Table II in the black-box setting. The horizontal green dotted line is the mismatch threshold
obtained from Equation (4). The orange dashed lines show the corresponding test accuracy for each pruning rate. Figures (d)
through (f) (second row) show the results for the MNIST and CIFAR10 benchmarks in the white-box setting. The dashed lines
demonstrate the pertinent accuracy per pruning rate.
TABLE III: Robustness of the DeepSigns framework against the model fine-tuning attack. The reported BER and the detection
rate value are averaged over 10 different runs. A value of 1 in the last row of the table indicates that the embedded watermark
is successfully detected, whereas a value of 0 indicates a false negative. For fine-tuning attacks, the WM-specific loss terms
proposed in Section IV are removed from the loss function and the model is retrained using the final learning rate of the
original DL model. After fine-tuning, the DL model will converge to another local minimum that is not necessarily a better
one (in terms of accuracy) for some benchmarks.
Metrics White-box Black-boxMNIST CIFAR10-CNN CIFAR10-WRN MNIST CIFAR10-CNN CIFAR10-WRN
Number of epochs 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200
Accuracy 98.21 98.20 98.18 70.11 62.74 59.86 91.79 91.74 91.8 98.57 98.57 98.59 98.61 98.63 98.60 87.65 89.74 88.35
BER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - -
Detection success 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
of pruning on watermark extraction/detection in both black-
box and white-box settings. In the black-box experiments,
DeepSigns can tolerate up to 60% and 35% parameter pruning
for the MNIST and CIFAR10 benchmarks, respectively, and
up to 90% and 99% in the white-box related experiments. The
WM lengths to perform watermarking in each benchmark are
listed in Table II.
As demonstrated in Figure 4, in occasions where pruning the
neural network yields a substantial bit error rate (BER) value,
we observe that the sparse model suffers from a large accuracy
loss compared to the baseline. As such, one cannot remove the
embedded watermark in a neural network by excessive pruning
of the parameters while attaining a comparable accuracy with
the baseline.
Model fine-tuning. Fine-tuning is another form of transfor-
mation attack that a third-party user might use to remove
WM information. To perform this type of attack, one needs to
retrain the target model using the original training data with
the conventional cross-entropy loss function (excluding the
watermarking specific loss functions). Table III summarizes
the impact of fine-tuning on the watermark detection rate
across all three benchmarks.
There is a trade-off between the model accuracy and the
success rate of watermark removal. If a third-party tries to
fine-tune the DL model using a high learning rate with the
goal of disrupting the underlying pdf of the activation maps
and eventually remove WMs, he will face a large degradation
in model accuracy. In our experiments, we use the same
learning rate as the one in the final stage of DL training
to perform the model fine-tuning attack. As demonstrated in
Table III, DeepSigns can successfully detect the watermark
information even after fine-tuning the deep neural network
for many epochs. Note that fine-tuning deep learning models
makes the underlying neural network converge to another local
minimum that is not necessarily equivalent to the original one
in terms of the ultimate prediction accuracy.
Watermark overwriting. Assuming the attacker is aware of
the watermarking technique, he may attempt to damage the
original watermark by embedding a new WM in the DL
model. In practice, the attacker does not have any knowledge
about the location of the watermarked layers. However, in our
experiments, we consider the worst-case scenario in which
the attacker knows where the WM is embedded but does
not know the original watermark information. To perform the
overwriting attack, the attacker follows the protocol discussed
in Section IV to embed a new set of watermark informa-
tion (using a different projection matrix, binary vector, and
input keys). Table IV summarizes the results of watermark
overwriting for all three benchmarks in the black-box setting.
As shown, DeepSigns is robust against the overwriting attack
and can successfully detect the original embedded WM in
the overwritten model. The decision thresholds shown in
Table IV for different key lengths are computed based on
Equation 4 as discussed in Section V-B. A bit error rate of
zero is also observed in the white-box setting for all the three
benchmarks after the overwriting attack. This further confirms
the reliability and robustness of the DeepSigns’ watermarking
approach against malicious attacks.
TABLE IV: DeepSigns is robust against overwriting attacks.
In this experiment, the reported number of mismatches is the
average value of multiple runs of the overwriting attack for the
same model using different input key set. Since the average
number of mismatches is smaller than the decision threshold
(Equation 4) for each key length, DeepSigns can successfully
detect the original WM after the overwriting attack.
Average # of mismatches Decision threshold Detection
successK = 20 K = 30 K = 20 K = 30
MNIST 8.3 15.4 13 21 1
CIFAR10-CNN 9.2 16.7 13 21 1
CIFAR10-WRN 8.5 10.2 13 21 1
C. Integrity
Figure 5 illustrates the results of integrity evaluation in
the black-box setting where unmarked models with the same
(models 1 to 3) and different (models 4 to 6) topologies are
queried by Alice’s keys. As shown in Figure 5, DeepSigns
satisfies the integrity criterion and has no false positives, which
means the ownership of unmarked models will not be falsely
proved. Note that unlike the black-box setting, in the white-box
scenario, different topologies can be distinguished by one-to-
one comparison of the architectures belonging to Alice and
Bob. For the unmarked model with the same topology in the
white-box setting, the integrity analysis is equivalent to model
fine-tuning, for which the results are summarized in Table III.
D. Capacity and Efficiency
The capacity of the white-box activation watermarking is as-
sessed by embedding binary strings of different lengths in the
intermediate layers. As shown in Figure 6, DeepSigns allows
up to 64, 128, and 128 bits capacity for MNIST, CIFAR10-
CNN, and CIFAR10-WRN benchmarks, respectively. Note
that there is a trade-off between the capacity and accuracy
which can be used by the IP owner (Alice) to embed a
larger watermark in her neural network model if desired.
For IP protection purposes, capacity is not an impediment
criterion as long as the capacity is sufficient to contain the
necessary WM information (N > 1). Nevertheless, we have
included this property in Table I to have a comprehensive list
of requirements.
In scenarios where the accuracy might be jeopardized due to
excessive regularization of the intermediate activation features
(e.g., when using a large watermarking strength for λ1 and
λ2, a large WM length N , or in cases where the DL model
is so compact that there are few free variables to carry the
WM information), one can mitigate the accuracy drop by
expanding each layer to include more free variables. Although
the probability of finding a poor local minimum is non-zero for
small-size networks, this probability decreases quickly with
the expansion of network size [16], [35], resulting in the
accuracy compensation. Note that, in all our experiments, we
do not expand the network to meet the baseline accuracy.
The layer expansion technique is simply a suggestion for
data scientists and DL model designers who are working on
developing new architectures that might require a higher WM
embedding capacity.
The computation and communication overhead in the Deep-
Signs framework is a function of the network topology (i.e.,
the number of parameters/weights in the pertinent DL model),
the selected input key length (K), and the size of the desired
embedded watermark N . In Section V, we provide a detailed
discussion on the computation and communication overhead
of DeepSigns in both white-box and black-box settings for
watermark extraction. Note that watermark embedding is per-
formed locally by Alice; therefore, there is no communication
overhead for WM embedding. In all our experiments, training
the DL models with WM-specific loss functions takes the same
number of epochs compared to training the unmarked model
(with only conventional cross-entropy loss) to obtain a certain
accuracy. As such, there is no tangible extra computation
overhead for WM embedding.
E. Security
As mentioned in Table I, the embedding of the watermark
should not leave noticeable changes in the probability distribu-
tion spanned by the target neural network. DeepSigns satisfies
the security requirement by preserving the intrinsic distribution
of weights/activations. For instance, Figure 7 illustrates the
histogram of the activations in the embedded layer in the
marked model and the same layer in the unmarked model for
the CIFAR10-WRN benchmark.
VII. COMPARISON WITH PRIOR-ART
Figure 8 provides a high-level overview of general capa-
bilities of existing DL WM frameworks. DeepSigns satisfies
the generalizability criterion and is applicable to both white-
box and black-box settings. One may speculate that white-
box and black-box scenarios can be treated equivalently by
embedding the watermark information only in the output layer.
In other words, one can simply ignore the white-box related
information (intermediate layers) and simply treat the white-
box setting as another black-box setting. We would like to
emphasize that the output layer can only potentially contain a
1-bit watermark; whereas an N-bit (N > 1) can be used for
watermarking the pdf distribution of the intermediate layers,
thus providing a higher capacity for IP protection. In this
paper, by white-box scenario, we refer to using the whole
capacity of a DL model for watermark embedding, including
both hidden and output layers.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5: Integrity analysis of different benchmarks. The green dotted horizontal lines indicate the detection threshold for various
WM lengths. The first three models (model 1-3) are neural networks with the same topology but different parameters compared
with the marked model. The last three models (model 4-6) are neural networks with different topologies ( [33], [34], [23]).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6: There is a trade-off between the length of WM vector (capacity) and watermark detection bit error rate. As the number
of the embedded bits (N ) increases, the test accuracy of the marked model decreases and the BER of the extracted WM
increases. The trend indicates that embedding excessive amount of information in the WM impairs the fidelity and reliability.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Distribution of the activation maps for marked (Figure
a) and unmarked (Figure b) models. DeepSigns preserves the
intrinsic distribution spanned by the model while robustly
embedding WM information. Note that the range of activations
is not deterministic in different models and cannot be used by
malicious users to detect the existence of a watermark.
Unlike prior works, DeepSigns uses the dynamic statistical
properties of DL models for watermark embedding. DeepSigns
incorporates the watermark information within the pdf dis-
tribution of the activation maps. Note that even though the
weights of a DL model are static during the inference phase,
activation maps are dynamic features that are both dependent
on the input keys and the DL model parameters/weights.
As we illustrate in Table V, our data- and model-aware
watermarking approach is significantly more robust against
overwriting and pruning attacks compared with the prior-art
white-box methods. None of the previous black-box deep
learning WM frameworks consider overwriting attacks in their
experiments. As such, no quantitative comparison is feasible
in this context. Nevertheless, DeepSigns performance against
overwriting attacks for black-box settings is summarized in
Table IV.
Fig. 8: High-level comparison with prior-art deep learning
watermarking frameworks.
In the rest of this section, we explicitly compare DeepSigns
performance against three state-of-the-art DL watermarking
frameworks existing in the literature.
A. White-box Setting
To the best of our knowledge, [10], [11] are the only existing
works that target watermarking hidden layers. These works
use the weights of the convolution layers for the purpose
of watermarking, as opposed to the activation sets used by
DeepSigns. As shown in [10], watermarking weights is not
robust against overwriting attacks. Table V provides a side-by-
side robustness comparison between our approach and these
prior works for different dimensionality ratio of the attacker’s
WM vector to the target weights/activations. As demonstrated,
DeepSigns’ dynamic data- and model-aware approach is sig-
nificantly more robust compared to prior-art [10], [11]. As for
its robustness against pruning attack, our approach is tolerant
of higher pruning rates. As an example consider the CIFAR10-
WRN benchmark, in which DeepSigns is robust up to 80%
pruning rate, whereas the works in [10], [11] are only robust
up to 65% pruning rate.
TABLE V: Robustness comparison against overwriting attack.
The watermark information embedded by DeepSigns can with-
stand overwriting attacks for a wide of range of NM ratio. In this
experiment, we use the CIFAR10-WRN since this benchmark
is the only model evaluated by [10], [11].
N to M Ratio Bit Error Rate (BER)
Uchida et.al [10],[11] DeepSigns
1 0.309 0
2 0.41 0
3 0.511 0
4 0.527 0
B. Black-box Setting
To the best of our knowledge, there are two prior works
that target watermarking the output layer for black-box sce-
narios [13], [12]. Even though the works by [13], [12] provide
a high WM detection rate (reliability), they do not address
the integrity requirement, meaning that these approaches can
lead to a high false positive rate in practice. For instance, the
work in [13] uses accuracy on the test set as the decision
policy to detect WM information. It is well known that there
is no unique solution to high-dimensional machine learning
problems [16], [2], [3]. In other words, there are various
models with even different topologies that yield approximately
the same test accuracy for a particular data application. Besides
high false positive rate, another drawback of using test accu-
racy for WM detection is the high overhead of communication
and computation [13]; therefore, their watermarking approach
incurs low efficiency. DeepSigns uses a small input key size
(K = 20) to trigger the WM information, whereas a typical
test set in DL problems can be two to three orders of
magnitude larger.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce DeepSigns, the first end-to-
end framework that enables reliable and robust integration
of watermark information in deep neural networks for IP
protection. DeepSigns is applicable to both white-box and
black-box model disclosure settings. It works by embedding
the WM information in the probability density distribution
of the activation sets corresponding to different layers of a
neural network. Unlike prior DL watermarking frameworks,
DeepSigns is robust against overwriting attacks and satisfies
the integrity criteria by minimizing the number of poten-
tial false alarms raised by the framework. We provide a
comprehensive list of requirements that empowers quantita-
tive and qualitative assessment of current and pending DL
watermarking approaches. Extensive evaluations using three
contemporary benchmarks corroborate the practicability and
effectiveness of the DeepSigns framework in the face of
malicious attacks, including parameter pruning/compression,
model fine-tuning, and watermark overwriting. We devise an
accompanying TensorFlow-based API that can be used by
data scientists and engineers for watermarking of different
neural networks. Our API provides support for various DL
model topologies, including (but not limited to) multi-layer
perceptrons, convolution neural networks, and wide residual
models.
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